Efficient equilibrium side contracts

Akira Yamada ()
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Akira Yamada: Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University

Economics Bulletin, 2003, vol. 3, issue 6, 1-7

Abstract: We analyze two-stage games where players may make binding offers of schemes for side payment acceptance (or rejection) as well as those for side payments before choosing actions. We find that any set of efficient actions maximizing the total payoff is played on an equilibrium path of the two-stage game when such bilateral contracts on side payments are interdependent.

JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-04-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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