Unraveling in a dynamic matching market with Nash bargaining

Frederick Chen ()
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Frederick Chen: Department of Economics, Wake Forest University

Economics Bulletin, 2003, vol. 3, issue 17, 1-6

Abstract: Equilibrium sorting in a finite-horizon, two-sided matching market with heterogeneous agents is considered. It is shown that, if the match production function is additively separable in agent-types and if the division of match output is determined by the Nash bargaining solution, then an unraveling of the market obtains as the unique equilibrium in which all matches are formed in the first period.

JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-07-28
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