On a property of mixed strategy equilibria of the pricing game

Massimo De Francesco ()

Economics Bulletin, 2003, vol. 4, issue 30, 1-8

Abstract: Before solving a two-stage capacity and pricing game for oligopoly, Boccard and Wauthy (2000) argue that, as under duopoly, at a mixed strategy equilibrium of the pricing game the largest firm's expected profit is the profit accruing to it as a Stackelberg follower when the rivals supply their entire capacity. We point to a serious mistake in their argument and then we see how this important property can be satisfactorily established.

Keywords: Bertrand; competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-09-19
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2003/Volume4/EB-03D40005A.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-03d40005

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().