Merit goods and phantom agents

Bart Capéau and Erwin Ooghe ()
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Erwin Ooghe: CES-KULeuven

Economics Bulletin, 2003, vol. 8, issue 8, 1-5

Abstract: Besley (1988) is one of the few exceptional articles containing non-welfarist optimal tax devices. Feehan (1990) reports an error in his first-best rules. The present note argues that Besley's second-best rules optimize the welfare of phantom agents rather than the corrected welfare of real existing agents in society.

Keywords: merit; goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 I3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-07-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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