A salary system for the assignment problem

Francisco Sanchez-Sanchez ()
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Francisco Sanchez-Sanchez: CIMAT

Economics Bulletin, 2004, vol. 3, issue 5, 1-9

Abstract: We propose a modification to the concept of the potential of agame à la Hart-Mas Colell to determine a salary system for theassignment problem. We obtain explicit formulas for the potentialof the assignment problem and for it's corresponding salarysystem. Also, we establish some properties of this salary systemand we give an interpretation in terms of the Shapley value.

Keywords: assignment; problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-02-26
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