Matching Markets: the Particular Case of Couples
David Cantala ()
Economics Bulletin, 2004, vol. 3, issue 45, 1-11
Abstract:
We consider one-to-one markets where workers can apply to a centralized procedure either alone or as a couple, in order to reach a core- stable matching of firms and workers. We impose stringent restrictions on the preferences of couples capturing the fact that spouses want to live in the same region, which are shown to be incompatible with the guarantee of the existence of a stable matching.
Keywords: couples (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-11-24
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