A meaningful two-person bargaining solution based on ordinal preferences

József Sákovics

Economics Bulletin, 2004, vol. 3, issue 26, 1-6

Abstract: In this note I argue that the traditional argument proving the non-existence of two-person ordinal bargaining solutions is misleading, and also provide an example of such a solution.

JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-07-16
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2004/Volume3/EB-04C70010A.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: A Meaningful Two-Person Bargaining Solution Based on Ordinal Preferences (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-04c70010

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley (j.p.conley@vanderbilt.edu).