Equivalence between best responses and undominated strategies: a generalization from finite to compact strategy sets

Alexander Zimper

Economics Bulletin, 2005, vol. 3, issue 7, 1-6

Abstract: For games with expected utility maximizing players whose strategy sets are finite, Pearce (1984) shows that a strategy is strictly dominated by some mixed strategy, if and only if, this strategy is not a best response to some belief about opponents' strategy choice. This note generalizes Pearce''s (1984) equivalence result to games with expected utility maximizing players whose strategy sets are arbitrary compact sets.

JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-02-19
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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