Equilibrium selection in coordination games: Why do dominated strategies matter?

Suren Basov

Economics Bulletin, 2004, vol. 3, issue 41, 1-3

Abstract: In this paper I illustrate by an example that strictly dominated strategies may affect the process of the equilibrium selection in coordination games. The strategy profile that gets selected may be both Pareto and risk dominated. This distinguishes it from the examples provided in Ellison (2000) and Maruta (1997).

JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-10-28
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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