On Technology Transfer to an Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly

X. Wang () and Bill Yang ()
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Bill Yang: Georgia Southern University

Economics Bulletin, 2004, vol. 4, issue 14, 1-6

Abstract: This note studies the transfer of a cost-reducing innovation from an independent patent-holder to an asymmetric Cournot duopoly that has different unit costs of production. It is found that royalty licensing can be superior to fixed-fee licensing for the independent patent-holder.

Keywords: Cournot; duopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-10-26
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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