On the Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Coalition Formation Rules

Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez ()

Economics Bulletin, 2004, vol. 4, issue 10, 1-8

Abstract: We analyze simple coalition formation problems in which a group of agents is partitioned into coalitions and agents' preferences only depend on the identity of the members of the coalition to which they belong. We study coaltion formation rules that associate to each profile of agents'' preferences a partition of the group of agents. Assuming that agents'' preferences are separable, we show that no coalition formation rule can satisfy the joint requirements of strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and voters'' sovereignty.

Keywords: Coalition; Formation; Rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-06-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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