Multilateral surveillance in the Stability and Growth Pact: an analysis through information sharing

Montserrat Ferré

Economics Bulletin, 2004, vol. 5, issue 15, 1-7

Abstract: In this article we use the concept of information sharing from oligopolistic games to analyse the multilateral surveillance of budget positions introduced with the Stability and Growth Pact. In a game between one monetary authority and various fiscal authorities, we will show that the multilateral surveillance does not lead to closer to target average budget deficits compared to a benchmark case of no surveillance.

JEL-codes: E6 H3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-07
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