Preferential Trade Agreements: Endogenous Response of the Third Country

Soamiely Andriamananjara

Economics Bulletin, 2004, vol. 6, issue 21, 1-11

Abstract: In most of the current debate on regionalism versus multilateralism, the countries excluded from a Preferential Trading Agreement (PTA) are assumed to be passive players with exogenously fixed trade policies. In reality however, non-members do react to the creation of a trading bloc and relaxing this assumption can provide useful insights. Using a political economy model, this paper explore the case where those excluded countries can adjust their commercial policies in order to minimize the negative effects of the PTA. It is shown that the creation of a PTA can lead the excluded countries to increase their trade barriers with respect to the PTA members.

Keywords: Political; Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-10-28
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2004/Volume6/EB-04F10007A.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-04f10007

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().