Collusion and the elasticity of demand
Economics Bulletin, 2004, vol. 12, issue 3, 1-6
The analysis of collusion in infinitely repeated Cournot oligopoly games has generally assumed that demand is linear, but this note uses constant-elasticity demand functions to investigate how the elasticity of demand affects the sustainability of collusion.
Keywords: cartel (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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