Collusion and the elasticity of demand

David Collie

Economics Bulletin, 2004, vol. 12, issue 3, 1-6

Abstract: The analysis of collusion in infinitely repeated Cournot oligopoly games has generally assumed that demand is linear, but this note uses constant-elasticity demand functions to investigate how the elasticity of demand affects the sustainability of collusion.

Keywords: cartel (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-03-19
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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