Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing Countries

Amitrajeet Batabyal and Peter Nijkamp

Economics Bulletin, 2004, vol. 15, issue 1, 1-10

Abstract: Goods are often allocated publically by means of queuing processes in developing countries. In such situations, which group of citizens should a corrupt government official favor? In addition, what should be the basis for this favoritism? To the best of our knowledge, these salient questions have received scant attention in the literature. Consequently, we use queuing theory to first demonstrate that when allocating goods publically, a case can be made for favoring a particular group of citizens. Next, we show that the nature of this favoritism depends not only on the bribes received by the corrupt government official but also on the efficiency with which this official discharges his duties.

Keywords: Bribery (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H4 O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-09-22
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Working Paper: Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing Countries (2004)
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