Fiscal federalism, discipline and selection adverse in the EU: Lessons from a theoretical model

Amélie Barbier-Gauchard ()

Economics Bulletin, 2005, vol. 28, issue 7, A0

Abstract: What is the optimal way to stabilize shocks and to take care of fiscal discipline in a fiscal union ? Among the various possible ways, this paper focuses on an inter-countries insurance scheme conditioned by the national preference for fiscal discipline of each government. We will show that the insurance scheme improves significantly the union's social welfare because it enables to cover deviations of the output gap and correct national preferences.

JEL-codes: E6 H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-08-08
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2005/Volume28/EB-05AA0007A.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Fiscal federalism, discipline and selection adverse in the EU: Lessons from a theoretical model (2005)
Working Paper: Fiscal Federalism, discipline and selection adverse in the EU: Lessons from a theoretical model (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-05aa0007

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().