When envy helps explain coordination

Thierry Vignolo ()
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Thierry Vignolo: LA.M.E.T.A

Economics Bulletin, 2005, vol. 3, issue 12, 1-7

Abstract: This paper identifies a class of symmetric coordination games in which the presence of envious people helps players to coordinate on a particular strict Nash equilibrium. In these games, the selected equilibrium is always risk-dominant. We also find that envious preferences are evolutionary stable when they lead to Pareto-efficiency.

Keywords: Envy; Coordination; games; Risk-dominance; Evolutionary; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-03-09
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-05c70011

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