Games with vector-valued payoffs and their application to competition between organizations

John Roemer

Economics Bulletin, 2005, vol. 3, issue 16, 1-13

Abstract: In 1959, Lloyd Shapley wrote a short paper on games with vector payoffs. He analyzed zero-sum matrix games. Here, we extend Shapley's equilibrium concept to general games with vector payoffs, introduce an organizational interpretation of the concept, elaborate the relationship of the original concept to another equilibrium concept where each player can be viewed as running a bargaining game among internal ‘factions,'' and finally comment upon its relationship to the concept of party unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE).

JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-03-25
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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