Provision of club goods: cost sharing and selection of a provider

Denis Lescop ()
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Denis Lescop: CRESE, Université de Franche Comté

Economics Bulletin, 2005, vol. 3, issue 25, 1-13

Abstract: This paper characterizes optimal mechanisms facilitating the cost sharing and the selection of a provider for a club good. These mechanisms are allocatively and Pareto efficient. However, it appears that transfers occur even when the good is not provided. This result is due to the weakening of the incentive notion to Bayesian-Nash equilibrium and to the balanced budget condition. This phenomena disappears if the setting is perfectly symmetric.

JEL-codes: C7 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-05-05
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