Players' Patience and Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model

Tomohiko Kawamori

Economics Bulletin, 2005, vol. 3, issue 43, 1-5

Abstract: This paper investigates a generalized Baron-Ferejohn model with different discount factors, different recognition probabilities and q-majority rule. In the paper, it is shown that if players are sufficiently patient, recognition probabilities are similar and the voting rule is not unanimous, each player's equilibrium payoff is inversely proportional to the ratio of the player''s discount factor to the harmonic mean of all players'' discount factors. This result implies the followings: (i) A less patient player obtains a greater payoff (ii) As a player slightly becomes more patient, her payoff becomes smaller (iii) The equilibrium payoffs do not depend on recognition probabilities and (iv) They do not also depend on q.

Keywords: Baron-Ferejohn; model; (Legislative; bargaining) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-09-15
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2005/Volume3/EB-05C70027A.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-05c70027

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().