Alternate contracts for side payments

Akira Yamada ()
Additional contact information
Akira Yamada: Sapporo University

Economics Bulletin, 2005, vol. 3, issue 46, 1-5

Abstract: We characterize efficient equilibrium outcomes of two-player games that remain equilibrium outcomes even when the two players may alternately make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. Our characterization result implies that alternately contracting for side payments has more efficiency of a certain type in equilibria than simultaneously side contracting which is analyzed by Jackson and Wilkie (2005).

Keywords: alternate; contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-10-25
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2005/Volume3/EB-05C70029A.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-05c70029

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().