Opting Out in a War of Attrition

Mercedes Adamuz ()
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Mercedes Adamuz: Department of Business, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México and Department of Economics, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

Economics Bulletin, 2005, vol. 3, issue 49, 1-6

Abstract: This paper analyzes a War of Attrition where players enjoy private information about their outside opportunities. The main message is that uncertainty about the possibility that the opponent opts out increases the equilibrium probability of concession.

JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-11-18
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