On The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States

Harold Houba and Quan Wen ()

Economics Bulletin, 2006, vol. 3, issue 3, 1-6

Abstract: Slantchev (2003, American Political Science Review, 97) studies a class of negotiation models to explain costly conflict between two completely informed nations. In one of his main propositions (Proposition 2.3), Slantchev provides a strategy profile to support the so-called extremal subgame perfect equilibrium, where one nation receives its lowest equilibrium payoff. By means of a counter example, we demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium with one nation's payoffs below the strategy profile provided in his Proposition 2.3 (Case 2).

JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-01-25
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