Double Bertrand competition among intermediaries when consumers can default

Frederique Bracoud ()

Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 4, issue 7, 1-16

Abstract: This paper models a sequential double price competition among intermediaries when their expected revenue per sale is affected by consumers' default. If this revenue is non-monotonic with the asking price, the Walrasian outcome may not be an equilibrium and demand rationing may emerge instead.

Keywords: Bertrand; Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-02-21
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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