Patent Licensing and Price Discrimination

Sandro Gleave () and Eberhard Feess ()
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Sandro Gleave: Federal Cartel Office, Germany

Economics Bulletin, 2006, vol. 4, issue 10, 1-10

Abstract: We extend the Kamien and Tauman model of patent licensing by introducing heterogeneous licensees that differ in their marginal costs using the licensed technology. We show that price discrimination does not necessarily ensure an efficient allocation of licenses. Moreover, it is possible that more licenses are sold without rather than with price discrimination.

Keywords: Endogenous; valuation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-02-27
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