A note on: jury size and the free rider problem

Christopher Spencer (), Paul Levine () and Parimal Bag ()
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Christopher Spencer: University of Surrey
Parimal Bag: University of Surrey

Economics Bulletin, 2006, vol. 4, issue 3, 1-12

Abstract: This note reassesses the basic result in Mukhopadhaya (2003) that, when jurors may acquire costly signals about a defendant's guilt, with a larger jury size the probability of reaching a correct verdict may in fact fall, contrary to the Condorcet Jury Theorem. We show that if the jurors coordinate on any one of a number of (equally plausible) asymmetric equilibria other than the symmetric equilibrium considered by Mukhopadhaya, the probability of accuracy reaches a maximum for a particular jury size and remains unchanged with larger juries, thus mitigating Mukhopadhaya''s result somewhat. However, the case for limiting the jury size – a recommendation by Mukhopadhaya – gains additional grounds if one shifts the focus from maximizing the probability of reaching a correct verdict to the maximization of the overall social surplus, measured by the expected benefits of jury decisions less the expected costs of acquiring signals.

JEL-codes: D7 K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-01-16
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Related works:
Working Paper: A Note on: Jury Size and the Free Rider Problem (2005)
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