A special case of self-protection: The choice of a lawyer

Benoît Sévi and Fabrice Yafil ()
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Fabrice Yafil: LAMETA Université de Montpellier

Economics Bulletin, 2005, vol. 4, issue 6, 1-8

Abstract: Considering self-protection, it is a well-known result that an increase in risk aversion does not unambiguously lead to a higher level of effort. In this paper, we consider a particular case of self-protection, the choice of a lawyer, assuming a positive relation between legal expenses and probability of success. In this context, level of effort is strictly monotone in risk aversion. We show that, paradoxically, the level of effort is not systematically higher for an indemnified more risk-averse agent than for a non-indemnified less risk-averse agent.

Keywords: increase; in; risk; aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-04-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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