Stochastic and deterministic menus in common agency games

Gwenael Piaser (gwenael.piaser@ipag.fr)

Economics Bulletin, 2005, vol. 4, issue 11, 1-6

Abstract: In this note, we argue that in Common Agency games the restriction todeterministic menus is critical. We give an simple example, with complete information and no moral hazard,where an equilibrium is not robust to the introduction of stochastic menus.

Keywords: Delegation; Principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-09-23
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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