THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN ANTIDUMPING DECISIONS: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Mustapha Sadni Jallab ()

Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 6, issue 18, 1-8

Abstract: This paper examines the determinants of recent antidumping decisions administered by the International Trade Commission and the Department of Commerce in the United States and the European Commission in Europe. We use case-specific data for the US and the EU, and political pressure data to investigate the macroeconomic and industry-level determinants of decision given by the antidumping authority. We estimate a Probit model to analyze the decisions of the authorities. Besides the economic factors, we find evidence of the existence of political influence as a motive for implementation antidumping measures.

Keywords: Antidumping; decisions; Unfair; competition; Probit; Analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-06-14
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