Private Provision of Public Goods under Delegated Common Agency

Tsung-Sheng Tsai ()

Economics Bulletin, 2005, vol. 8, issue 13, 1-9

Abstract: This paper considers a delegated common agent who produces a public good with private information regarding his cost. We show that truthful strategies are not optimal for principals, and that the agent enjoys some rent in equilibrium. It is not always that all principals make contributions: the number of contracts with positive contributions accepted by the agent in equilibrium is non-increasing as the agent becomes less efficient.

JEL-codes: D8 H0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-11-01
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