A comment on '''International Cooperation for Sale''''

Toshiyuki Fujita ()
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Toshiyuki Fujita: Kyushu University

Economics Bulletin, 2006, vol. 8, issue 10, 1-7

Abstract: We reexamine the analysis of Barrett (2001), that explores the size of a self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Barrett stresses that the key feature to realize the self-enforcing agreement is asymmetries among countries, but we get the following results certain condition that usually does not hold is required for the Barrett's solution, so it is necessary to reconsider the model settings.

JEL-codes: C7 H0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-07-24
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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