Crime timing

Christian At and Nathalie Chappe ()
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Nathalie Chappe: Universite de Franche Comte, CRESE

Economics Bulletin, 2005, vol. 11, issue 2, 1-7

Abstract: This note develops a dynamic model of crime that determines the conditions under which it is optimal for a criminal to delay commission of a crime rather than committing it immediately. It also examines the optimal enforcement strategy in this context. We derive two results. The first is that it might be optimal to postpone a crime that is profitable now if its benefit increase quickly enough in the future and that a crime that is not yet optimal might become so in the future. The second is that it is optimal to underdeter crime.

JEL-codes: K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-09-13
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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