Research Joint Ventures Cartelization with Asymmetric R&D Spillovers

Gamal Atallah

Economics Bulletin, 2005, vol. 12, issue 18, 1-11

Abstract: The paper analyzes the profitability of R&D cooperation under asymmetric spillovers. It is shown that a firm prefers R&D competition to RJV cartelization when its own spillover rate is low and the spillover rate of its competitor is high. While it prefers R&D cartelization to RJV cartelization when the spillover rate of its competitor is sufficiently high. The equilibrium configuration is RJV cartelization for low spillover asymmetries, R&D competition for intermediate asymmetries, and R&D cartelization for high asymmetries.

Keywords: Asymmetric; Spillovers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 O3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-10-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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