A psychological game with interdependent preference types

J. Atsu Amegashie ()
Additional contact information
J. Atsu Amegashie: University of Guelph

Economics Bulletin, 2006, vol. 28, issue 12, A0

Abstract: Suppose you are invited to a party, movie, dinner, etc not because your company is desired but because the inviter would feel guilty if she did not invite you. Interestingly, this social interaction is, under certain conditions a game with interdependent preferences types combined with either (i) a psychological game, or (ii) a standard Bayesian game. I find a complex social interaction in this game. In particular, there exists a unique equilibrium in which a player may stick to a strategy of accepting every invitation with the goal of discouraging insincere invitations. This may lead one to erroneously infer that this player is eagerly waiting for an invitation, when indeed his behavior is driven more by strategic considerations than by an excessive desire for social acceptance.

JEL-codes: Z1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-10-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2006/Volume28/EB-06AA0020A.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-06aa0020

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().