Caps in asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information

Nicolas Sahuguet

Economics Bulletin, 2006, vol. 3, issue 9, 1-8

Abstract: We study asymmetric all-pay auctions where two privately informed agents bid for a prize. We show that capping the bids is profitable for a designer who wants to maximize the sum of bids (revenue). This finding confims the results of Che and Gale (1998) in the context of incomplete information and completes the analysis of Gavious, Moldovanu and Sela (2002) by analyzing the case of ex-ante asymmetric players.

Keywords: All-pay; auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-04-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2006/Volume3/EB-06C70004A.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-06c70004

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().