On the equivalence of G-weak and -strong cores in the marriage problem

Koji Takamiya ()
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Koji Takamiya: Institute of Social and Economic Research

Economics Bulletin, 2006, vol. 3, issue 20, 1-8

Abstract: In the marriage problem (two-sided one-to-one matching problem), it is well-known that the weak core, the strong core and the set of stable matchings are all equivalent. This paper generalizes the above observation considering the G-weak core and the G-strong core. These are core concepts in which blocking power is restricted to the coalitions belonging to the prescribed class of coalitions G. I give a necessary and sufficient condition that G should satisfy for the equivalence of the G-weak core and the G-strong core.

JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-08-31
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