Subgame-perfect market sharing agreements

Toru Hokari (), Seiji Murakoshi () and Masaki Iimura ()
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Toru Hokari: Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences
Seiji Murakoshi: Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba
Masaki Iimura: Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba

Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 3, issue 7, 1-14

Abstract: Jackson and Watts (2002, J Econ Theory) study a dynamic process of network formation assuming that each player is myopic. In this note, we study the same dynamic process but assume that each player is farsighted. In particular, we consider a finite-horizon version of such a dynamic process in a model of market sharing agreements introduced by Belleframme and Bloch (2004, Int Econ Review), and investigate which networks are likely to be realized when the number of the players is three.

Keywords: finite; horizon (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-01-25
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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