Two-sided Matching, Who Marries Whom? And what Happens upon Divorce?

Terence Tai Leung Chong

Economics Bulletin, 2006, vol. 4, issue 21, 1-7

Abstract: Conventional two-sided matching game is a one-period game. In this note, we contribute to the existing literature by examining a multi-period two-sided matching problem allowing for the possibility of a divorce. We assume that the matching game is played repeatedly and the payoff matrix changes over time. It is shown that the rule of divorce will affect the equilibrium of a marriage game. An empirical implication of our result is that a country with a well-developed financial market will have a better marital outcome as compared to a less-developed country.

JEL-codes: D0 K0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-06-12
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