Mixed motives in a Cournot game

Thomas Riechmann ()
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Thomas Riechmann: University of Magdeburg, FEMM

Economics Bulletin, 2006, vol. 4, issue 29, 1-8

Abstract: The paper analyzes a Cournot model with two types of firms: Maximizers of profits and maximizers of relative payoffs. It is shown that the equilibrium is located somewhere between the regular Cournot-Nash equilibrium and the competitive Walrasian (or Bertrand-) equilibrium.

Keywords: Bertrand; Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-09-20
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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