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When Inertia Generates Political Cycles

Raphael Soubeyran ()

Economics Bulletin, 2006, vol. 4, issue 31, 1-8

Abstract: In this note, we propose a simple infinite horizon of elections with two candidates. We suppose that the government policy presents some degree of inertia, i.e. a new government cannot completely change the policy implemented by the incumbent. When the policy inertia is strong enough, no party can win the elections a consecutive infinite number of times.

Keywords: Policy; inertia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-10-02
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