Fiscal competition and tax instrument choice: the role of income inequality

Joshua Hall

Economics Bulletin, 2006, vol. 8, issue 12, 1-8

Abstract: School districts in Ohio have the choice of two tax instruments with which to raise revenue: the property tax and a residence-based income tax. Economic theory predicts that local governments, if given the choice, would prefer to diversify their tax base to reduce the political costs associated with excessive reliance on one tax. Why then, do some school districts not utilize the income tax? This paper extends earlier work on this issue by showing that income inequality is negatively associated with the choice of an income tax.

JEL-codes: H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-10-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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