Technology adoption in a community of heterogeneous education level: Who are your good neighbors?

Yusuke Ono ()
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Yusuke Ono: University of Tokyo

Economics Bulletin, 2006, vol. 15, issue 8, 1-11

Abstract: This paper examines the role of education in technology adoption in a multi-agent finite-time dynamic game setting. It is assumed that education decreases prior variance on the best action in using a new technology in the target-input Bayesian model, experience accumulates in a community (social learning information spillover), and the experience, however, is not transferrable from one technology to another. The paper shows that, depending on the schooling distribution, the equilibrium s different dynamic patterns of technology adoption.

Keywords: choice; of; technology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I2 O3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-09-06
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