The paradox of new members in the Council of Ministers: a noncooperative approach

Jeng-Bau Lin ()
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Jeng-Bau Lin: Department of Business Administration, National Chung-Hsing University

Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 28, issue 14, A0

Abstract: Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant. This phenomenon is known as the paradox of new members. This paper shows that the paradox has theoretically occurred in the EU using the leading model of legislative bargaining. Furthermore, it is possible for a majority of members to be in favor of enlargement, even if voters are bargaining over a fixed budget.

JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-12-13
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-07aa0027

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