On a Nonlinear Feedback Strategy Equilibrium of a Dynamic Game

Kenji Fujiwara () and Norimichi Matsueda

Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 3, issue 8, 1-10

Abstract: This paper reports an intriguing property of a nonlinear feedback Nash strategy equilibrium in a dynamic game with no state variable in the payoff of each player. While the open-loop Nash and linear feedback Nash equilibria coincide with the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium in such a framework, the nonlinear feedback strategy can be properly defined and, furthermore, a particular type of the equilibrium outcomes approximates the bilateral collusion, as is originally proved by Tsutsui and Mino (1990) for a standard differential game with one state variable.

JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-02-24
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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