Learning in Bayesian regulation: desirable or undesirable?

Ismail Saglam and Semih Koray ()
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Semih Koray: Bilkent University

Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 3, issue 12, 1-10

Abstract: We examine the social desirability of learning about the regulated agent in a generalized principal-agent model with incomplete information. An interesting result we obtain is that there are situations in which the agent prefers a Bayesian regulator to have more, yet incomplete, information about his private type.

JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-04-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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