Shapley's "2 by 2" theorem for game forms

Nikolai Kukushkin ()

Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 3, issue 33, 1-5

Abstract: If a finite two person game form has the property that every 2-by-2 fragment is Nash consistent, then no derivative game admits an individual improvement cycle.

JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-08-07
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