On the existence of an equilibrium in the Split-the-Difference Mechanism over an uncountable set with a singular part

Jeremy Bertomeu ()
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Jeremy Bertomeu: Carnegie Mellon University

Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 3, issue 26, 1-5

Abstract: Broman (89) analyzes the mixed Nash equilibria of the split-the-difference mechanism over countable sets. She leaves as an open question whether there may be mixed equilibria over uncountable sets with singular parts. In this note, I propose such an equilibrium the support of the strategies is the union of a countable set and an interval.

Keywords: Double; Auction; Bargaining; Mixed; Equilibrium; Complete; Information; Singular (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-06-20
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