Some equivalence results between mixed strategy Nash equilibria and minimax regret in 2x2 games
Andrea Gallice ()
Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 3, issue 29, 1-8
We show that in any 2x2 game in which a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists, the probability distribution that this equilibrium assigns to player i is either the same or the mirror image of the distribution that the minimax regret criterion defines for player j. Sharper results that connect the two distributions for the same player are then established for the class of symmetric games.
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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