The core of a housing market with externalities

Ismail Saglam and Ayşe Mumcu

Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 3, issue 57, 1-5

Abstract: It is known that the core of a housing market always exists and contains a unique matching when agents have independent preferences. We show that when preferences of agents are interdependent, there are housing markets with an empty core as well as housing markets with a core containing more than one matching.

Keywords: core. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-11-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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