Solutions without dummy axiom for TU cooperative games

Francisco Sanchez-Sanchez (), Ruben Juarez () and Luis Hernandez-Lamoneda ()
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Francisco Sanchez-Sanchez: CIMAT
Luis Hernandez-Lamoneda: CIMAT

Economics Bulletin, 2008, vol. 3, issue 1, 1-9

Abstract: In this paper we study an expression for all additive, symmetric and efficient solutions, i.e., the set of axioms that traditionally are used to characterize the Shapley value except for the dummy axiom. Also, we obtain an expression for this kind of solutions by including the self duality axiom. These expressions allow us to give an alternative formula for the consensus value, the generalized consensus value and the solidarity solution. Furthermore, we introduce a new axiom called coalitional independence which replaces the symmetry axiom and use it to get similar results.

Keywords: axiomatic; characterization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-01-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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